THE SEMANTICS-PRAGMATICS INTERFACE: THE CASE OF THE SINGULAR FEMININE DEMONSTRATIVE IN JORDANIAN ARABIC

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Abstract. The aim in this study is to investigate the interface between semantics and pragmatics in relation to the use of the indexical demonstrative 'haay' 'this-S.F.' in Jordanian Arabic (JA)[1]. It is argued here that an analysis of meaning in relation to context-sensitivity inherent in the use of 'haay' can give evidence to the view that semantic and pragmatic processes can be distinguished from each other. I have found that the meaning of 'haay' consists of three distinct levels: linguistic, semantic, and pragmatic meaning. The denotational and conventional senses of 'haay' comprise its linguistic meaning, its semantic meaning is generated when any of the variables in the linguistic meaning is selected in relation to 'narrow context', the pragmatic meaning depends on relating the semantic meaning to an entity in the physical context of interaction. The results of this study support the view that the boundary between semantics and pragmatics can be distinctively demarcated.
Keywords: semantics-pragmatics interface, deixis, demonstratives, Jordanian Arabic

Джарбо Самер Омар. Кореляція прагматики та семантики на прикладі вказівного займенника однини жіночого роду в йорданському варіанті арабської мови.
Анотація. Метою цього дослідження є вивчення взаємодії семантики та прагматики на прикладі використання вказівного займенника *"haay" ("ця")* в йорданському варіанті арабської мови. У статті йдеться про те, що аналіз значення та його зв'язку з контекстною чутливістю, які притаманні використанню *"haay"*, може свідчити про те, що семантичні та прагматичні процеси можна розмежовувати. Автор стверджує, що значення *"haay"* складається з трьох чітких рівнів: мовного, семантичного та прагматичного. Денотативне та конвенціональне значення *"haay"* утворюють його лінгвістичне значення. Семантичне значення формується тоді, коли будь-яка змінна в лінгвістичному значенні вибирається у відношенні до "вузького контексту", а прагматичне значення залежить від відношення семантичного значення до об'єкта у фізичному контексті взаємодії. Результати цього дослідження засвідчують думку про те, що семантика та прагматика можуть бути чітко розмежовані.
Ключові слова: кореляція семантики та прагматики, дейксис, вказівні займенники, йорданський варіант арабської мови.

1. Introduction and Background

Many researchers define pragmatics as, generally, the study of the speaker's intended meaning in the context of interaction; semantics is defined as the study of

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[1] The following symbols have been used to represent sounds and grammatical inflections occurring in JA structures: /'/ a glottal stop, /H/ a voiceless pharyngeal fricative, /kh/ voiceless velar fricative, /3/ voiced pharyngeal fricative, /D/ emphatic voiced dental-alveolar stop, /th/ a voiced interdental fricative, /a/-/aa/ short-long vowel /a/, /i/-/ii/ short-long vowel /i/, /u/-/uu/ short-long vowel /u/, S. (singular), Pl. (plural), M. (masculine), F. (feminine).

propositions, linguistic information, or literality fixed to words or sentences irrespective of context (see Stalnaker, 1972:383; Katz, 1977:14; Gazdar, 1979:4–5; Kempson, 1988:139; Bach, 1997; Recanati, 2002; Grice, 1978; and Levinson, 1995). Deictic nominal demonstratives have a semantic content and a pragmatic function[1]. In linguistics, semantic content is traditionally taken to be fixed or context-insensitive while pragmatic function is considered changeable and context-sensitive. According to Manning (2001:56), demonstratives like 'this' and 'that' can be described as 'indexical denotationals' (following Silverstien, 1976) since they combine semantic and pragmatic properties. The semantic aspect of a deictic demonstrative is represented by its denotational meaning(s) (i.e. senses) while the pragmatic side is represented by indexing (pointing at) actual referents in context. A deictic demonstrative consists of sense and index that complement each other during actual interactive use (see Manning, 2002; Kaplan, 1977).

There are two main views concerning the interface between semantics and pragmatics (see Bach, 1997; Recanati, 2002; Carston, 2008; Cappelen and Lepore, 2005). Linguists and philosophers who represent the first view 'reduce' one of the fields to the other (e.g. pragmatics to include semantics) (see Huang, 2007:210–211). The other view maintains that the boundaries between the two fields are distinct since these two have separate processes[2].

1.1. The Semantic and Sociolinguistic Aspects of the Demonstrative *haay*

In Jordanian Arabic (JA), demonstratives are distinguished according to the gender (male/female) and number (singular/plural) of the referent (see Table 1 below). The demonstrative *haay* 'this-S.F.' has more variation concerning features of number and gender than any of the other demonstratives in JA. The classical, unmarked, literal meaning of *haay* in JA is that it is a proximal singular feminine demonstrative (i.e. 'this-feminine'). Table (1) shows demonstratives that are used in JA along with their equivalents in Standard Arabic (SA) (see Jarbou, 2012 for further details).

Table 1

Demonstratives in JA and SA and their unmarked denotational content

Demonstrative in JA	Equivalent demonstrative in SA	Number	Gender	Meaning
haaD(a)	*haatha*	singular	M	'this'
haDaak	*thaalika*	singular	M	'that'
haay	*haathihi*	singular	F	'this'
haDiik/hathiik	*tilka*	singular	F	'that'
haDawl	*haa'ula'*	dual/plural	M/F	'these'
haDlak	*'ulaa'ika*	dual/plural	M/F	'those'

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[1] In general, deixis is reference to any of the elements of the context of an utterance (see Lyons, 1977; Levinson, 2006). The focus in this paper is on *haay* as a deictic demonstrative that is used to refer to objects, people, or other entities in the real world of interactants. For further information on the different uses of demonstratives in JA see Jarbou (2010).

[2] For a comprehensive introduction to the semantics-pragmatics interface, see Huang (2007: 209–224).

However, the demonstrative *haay* has other denotations: it can be used to index a plural feminine or a plural masculine entity. JA has a definite demonstrative that is specifically used to index masculine and feminine plural entities, which is *haDawl* 'these-Pl.M./F.' (see Jarbou, 2010). Using *haay*, which is singular and feminine in unmarked use, instead of *haDawl* to refer to masculine or feminine plural entities can be described as set by convention. This usage, however has two aspects: the singular feminine demonstrative can be used to refer to human plural entities or to non-human plural entities. When encoding non-human plural entities, the usage is mostly perceived as the same as using the plural demonstrative *haDawl* 'these'.

The social perceptions of using *haay* to encode plural human entities are related to the issue that a speaker mostly intends to communicate a further message in addition to the denotative semantic meaning of *haay*. This usage of *haay* is known by members of JA speech community. In JA, the speaker has the option to use either the singular feminine demonstrative *haay* or the plural demonstrative *haDawl* to point to a group of people. When referring to a group of people in a particular context by using *haay*, the speaker usually intends to express particular feelings or attitudes towards the referent such as displeasure, exasperation, sarcasm, and/or astonishment concerning; this represents the marked use of *haay* as in the following examples:

1. *akiid* **haay** *hi liDyuuf illi bidha ti3mal Haflih*
   'Sure this-S.F. she guests-M/F which-S.F. wants- S.F. make-S.F. party'
   'Are you sure that these guests can make a party'
2. **haay** *hi labTaal illi bidha tfuuz ilyuum*
   'this-S.F. she champion-Pl.M wants-S.F. win-S.F. today'
   'Are these the champions who were going to win today (as you've told me)'

In (1), the speaker is wondering that the small number of guests who have arrived to a wedding party cannot make a lively, boisterous party; the use of *haay* is intended to communicate the message that he is both frustrated and exasperated. If the speaker used the unmarked plural demonstrative *haDawl*, her utterance will sound more like a question without the added pragmatic meanings. In (2), the speaker is expressing sarcasm and exaggerated depreciation by using *haay*. Of course, using the unmarked plural demonstrative instead of *haay* would not convey the same degree of feelings unless accompanied by extra-linguistic elements such as tone of voice (which would still not be as intense as the perceptions conveyed through using *haay*). It is noticeable also that in all of these utterances where *haay* is used instead of the unmarked plural demonstrative that verbs and adjectives in the sentence would agree in gender and number with the singular feminine *haay* though the referent can be a group of males or a group of females. Verbs and adjectives are inflected for gender and number in JA, and so even though the referent could be plural and masculine, the verbs *bidha*, *ti3mal* , *tfuuz* in (1) and (2) above have singular feminine inflections to agree with the singular feminine *haay* rather than with the plural masculine or feminine referents (see also utterances 3–8 below).

However, the speaker does not intend, nor does the addressee understand, any suggestions of effeminizing the referent in these usages[1]. These usages are conventional.

These overt messages in interaction can be looked at as the pragmatic interactive meaning of the demonstrative. The hypothesis in this paper is that the overall meaning of the demonstrative *haay* in contexts that involve plural human referents depends on distinct, though interrelated, semantic and pragmatic processes that can be differentiated based on their level of sensitivity to context. It is assumed here that analyzing the semantic and pragmatic processes involved in generating the meaning of *haay* will add support to the view that semantics and pragmatics are distinct though complimentary subfields of linguistics.

2. Methods

The data for this study have been collected from personal observations of the language spoken to and around the researcher in daily interactions in the Jordanian society over a period of around one and a half years. The data consisted of 71 usages of *haay* in contexts where the referent is a group of humans: 44 involved plural female referents and 27 involved plural male referents.

The utterances, in addition to descriptions of the context of interaction, were recorded in a notebook. These descriptions included information about the interactants, the referents (e.g. gender), location of the interaction, and whether the referent is present in the physical environment of interaction or not (it can be something experienced in the past). Instances where the referent is one feminine entity or is non-human were disregarded since the speaker in these contexts usually does not intend to convey any overt (pragmatic) meanings other than the semantic meaning of the demonstrative. The researcher noticed that in all of these instances of using *haay*, the speaker had assumed that the addressee has enough background information to recognize the referent in context; this information has been of two types: perceptual (usually visual) or cognitive (relating to memory).

This paper focuses on *haay* as a complex demonstrative. Braun (2008:57) defines complex demonstratives as "linguistic expressions of the form 'that *N*' or 'this *N*', where *N* is a common noun phrase." In English, singular complex demonstratives of the form 'this/that N' are distinguished from plural ones of the form 'these/those Ns' (see Braun, 2008:57; Lepore and Ludwig, 2000).

However, since *haay* can be used as a singular or a plural complex demonstrative, depending on context, it will have the form 'this N' or 'this Ns' where *Ns* stands for any feminine or masculine plural entity as in *haay elbanaatt* literally meaning 'this-S.F. girls' and *haay liwlaad* literally meaning 'this-S.F. boys'. The following examples show how *haay* is used in comparison to the other demonstratives in JA:

3. ***haay*** *ilbint miin samaHilha tudkhul baitna*

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[1] Tracing the historical origin of the plural marked interpretations of *haay* is the beyond the scope and space considerations of this paper

'this-S.F. girl who allowed her to enter our house'

'who allowed this girl into our house?'

4. ***haay*** *ilbanaat mish* ***jaayi tudrus***

'this-S.F. girls is not come-S.F. to study-S.F.'

'these girls did not come here to study!'

5. ***haDawl*** *ilbanat mish* ***jayaat yudrusu***

'these-Pl. girls are not come-Pl.F. to study-Pl.'

'these girls did not come here to study'

6. ***haay*** *liawlad mish* ***jaayi tit3alam***

'this-S.F. boys is not come-S.F. to learn-S.F.'

'these boys did not come here to study!'

7. ***haDawl*** *liwlad mish* ***jaayiin yudrusu***

 'these boys are not come-Pl.M. to study-Pl.M.'

 'these boys did not come here to study!'

8. ***haay*** *il3umal miin galha tug3ud huun*

'this-S.F. worker-Pl.M. who told her to work-S.F. here?'

'who told those workers to work here!'

The demonstrative *haay* is used to point at a singular feminine entity in utterance (3), at a plural feminine entity in (4) and at a plural masculine entity in (6) and (8). The plural feminine/masculine *haDawl* is used to point at a plural feminine in (3) and at a plural masculine entity in (7). The underlying structure of *haay*, following Braun's (2008) definition of complex demonstratives, would be [this [CNP]] where 'CNP' is a common noun phrase. The underlying structure of *haay* can, thus, be represented as [*haay* [CNP]] where CNP refers to a limited set of mutually exclusive denotational content (i.e. senses) of *haay*. This set is limited because there are constraints on the nouns that can follow *haay* in actual use. These constraints pertain to number and gender of the common noun. The elements within this set are only three: a. a singular feminine entity as in utterance (3), b. a plural feminine entity as in (4), or c. a plural masculine entity as in utterances (2), (6), and (8). Using *haay* to encode a singular, masculine entity is semantically anomalous in JA. Understanding how any of these senses becomes the final meaning of *haay* is taken as the basis for this study of the interface between semantics and pragmatics.

Investigation of the interface between semantics and pragmatics essentially relates to arriving at comprehensive and practical definitions of each of these fields of linguistics (see Ariel, 2002; Bach, 1997; Recanati, 2002, 2004; Giora, 1997, 2002; Levinson, 1995). The search for such definitions has principally focused on the following core aspects: (1) literal and non-literal meaning (see Ariel, 2002; Katz, 1977; Berg, 2002), (2) the minimalist views of semantics and pragmatics (see Carston, 2008; Cappelen and Lepore, 2005; Bach, 1997), (3) arguments focusing on 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' (see Recanati, 1989, 1993, 1995; Dascal, 1987; Gibbs, 1984, 1994; Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Clark, 1996), and (4) discussions of context-sensitivity such as those relating to 'narrow' and 'broad' contexts (see Bach, 1997; Carston, 2008).

In response to the issue that there are two main views concerning the semantics-pragmatics interface, the aim in this study is to seek answers to the following questions:

1) What is the role of context in determining the semantic and pragmatic values of *haay*?

2) Are the semantic and pragmatic aspects of the meaning of *haay* distinguishable from each other?

It is not my aim in this study to arrive at new definitions of semantics and pragmatics. However, I believe that investigating the pragmatic and semantic aspects of the demonstrative *haay* can add significant insights research focused on the semantics-pragmatics interface. The issues that seem most relevant and fruitful in this regard relate to understanding literality, conventionality, and context-sensitivity.

3. Results and Discussion

This section discusses the relations between the levels of meaning inherent in using the demonstrative *haay* in relation to different stages of context of use.

3.1. Literality and Contextuality

Literal and non-literal meanings are classically differentiated in line with, among other criteria, context-dependent vs. context-independent, semantic vs. pragmatic meaning, direct vs indirect, entailed vs implicated, linguistic vs. contextual, and sentence meaning vs utterance meaning (see Ariel, 2002; Gibbs, 1984, 1999; Dascal, 1987; Katz, 1977; Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Gibbs and Moise, 1997; Nicolle and Clark, 1999; Vicente, 2002). However, according to Ariel (2002: 364), recent "research has convincingly shown that literal and non-literal meanings" at least as classically defined, "cannot always be distinguished from each other" (see also Rumelhart, 1979; Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Searle, 1978; Lakoff, 1987; and Gibbs, 1994).

Among the three denotational senses of *haay*, the most salient one is that referring to a singular feminine entity. However, this saliency would be diverted or deleted in contexts where the noun following the demonstrative *haay* is plural feminine or plural masculine (see Giora, 1999 and 1997 on 'salient meaning'). The salient meaning of *haay* is 'erased' when *haay* is used to refer to a plural feminine or a plural masculine entity as in examples (2) and (4), respectively. The salient meaning of the demonstrative *haay* is inactivated in favor of less salient meanings according to contextual 'demands'. I call them 'demands' because these marked uses of the demonstrative are required by the speaker in order to convey specific intentions.

Speakers of JA would usually use the non-salient meanings of *haay* to convey feelings and opinions beyond the semantic meaning of the demonstrative. It seems that, in JA, using the singular feminine demonstrative to index a plural entity serves better to intensely express those feelings than simply using the traditional plural demonstratives.

These marked senses of *haay* can be described as metaphorical or non-figurative but, nonetheless, they are still part of the linguistic meaning of the demonstrative; they are not pragmatic in nature. It seems that in one stage during the historical development of the use of demonstratives in JA, the metaphorical uses had been gradually added to the linguistic senses of *haay* to indicate disapproval or surprise. Lee (1990:212), following MacCormac (1985), believes that words "evolve additional meanings" and become polysemous as they progress in history and are frequently used by a language community. Lee (1990) argues that these additional meanings that lead to changing the semantic content of words can come through the metaphorical usage of these words. These metaphorical usages later become part of the lexical entries of words (Lee, 1990:211–212). Ariel believes that words tend to integrate some of their contextually derived meanings (above 'what is said') into their linguistic (literal) meaning in the course of their history. Now, such a process must be gradual, and hence the difficulty of teasing apart implicated and semantic meanings (in some cases) (Ariel, 2002:366).

Likewise, we can say that the metaphorical (i.e. marked) meanings of *haay* seem to have been added to the denotational unmarked meaning (i.e. singular feminine) of the demonstrative in latter historical stages. These metaphorical or 'contextual extensions' were later conventionalized and became part of the linguistic meaning of *haay* in JA[1]. But because these conventionalized meanings have been added to the unmarked meaning of *haay* (i.e. denoting a singular, feminine entity) for specific contexts, they remain marked and non-salient in frequency and occurrence. If we look at these marked conventional uses of *haay* as metaphorical or that they had been metaphorical at an early stage during the development of the semantic repertoire of *haay*, this means that these uses are originally non-literal. We can keep in mind that metaphorical interpretations are traditionally considered non-literal in nature (see Bach, 1994).

The use of singular demonstratives in SA and JA is similar with regard to accord between the gender features of demonstratives and their referents (whether human or non-human). The difference involves demonstratives used to encode plural entities since human entities in SA are referred to using plural demonstratives while non-human entities are encoded with the singular feminine *haathihi* (i.e. equivalent of *haay*) only. In JA, however, plural entities, both human and non-human, can be encoded either with plural demonstratives or with the singular feminine *haay* regardless of gender.

To conclude this section, the three senses of the deictic *haay* cannot be considered as having the traditional features of literal meaning as classically defined. The second and third senses are obviously metaphorical. The speaker expects the addressee to recognize that *haay* is intended to have any of the three senses based on knowing the noun within the CNP in the complex demonstrative structure. Recognizing the entities pointed at by the speaker demands that the addressee be cognitively aware of the physical context surrounding interaction.

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[1] See Lee (1990) and Sweetser (1990) on the conventionalization of metaphorical meanings.

These two points make it necessary to investigate the linguistic and actual nature of the context of utterances where *haay* is used.

3.2. Interface and Context: Linguistic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Meanings

Because of the varied definitions of literal meaning and of the many assumptions, controversies and contradictions involved in and concerning these definitions, the term 'literal meaning' should not be 'trusted' when investigating the distinction between the different levels of the meaning of, at least, indexicals. In this study, I replace it (i.e. literal meaning) with two distinct concepts: linguistic meaning and semantic meaning. These two, in turn, are differentiated with regard to the concept of context-sensitivity.

The major parameter that will be the criterion for this investigation of the interface between semantic and pragmatic processes is context-sensitivity. This would have been an easy task had we been able to easily categorize the various language phenomena as either definitely context-sensitive or insensitive.

Traditionally, semantic information is considered to be context-insensitive while pragmatic propositions are considered to be context-sensitive. However, Ariel (2002) argues that context-dependence versus independence cannot be taken as distinguishing literal from non-literal meaning since context-dependent inferencing works for both what is called literal and non-literal meanings. According to Bach (1997), and taking indexicals into consideration, semantic content can be context-sensitive, though on a limited scale. Bach (1997) distinguishes between 'narrow context' and 'broad context' in order to investigate the pervasiveness of context in determining the value of what is uttered:

There are two sorts of contextual information, one much more restricted in scope than the other. Information that plays the limited role of combining with linguistic information to determine content (in the sense of fixing it) is restricted to a short list of variables, such as the identity of the speaker and the hearer and the time and place of an utterance. Contextual information in the broad sense is anything that the hearer is to take into account to determine (in the sense of ascertain) the speaker's communicative intention (Bach, 1997:39).

The concepts of 'narrow context' and 'broad context' as used in this article are borrowed from Bach (1997) . Though not the same as Bach's concepts these terms, as used here, are generally similar to Bach's in that 'narrow context' is considered as "much more restricted in scope and much more limited in role than broad context" (Huang, 2007:215). The 'short list' of variables within what Bach refers to as 'restricted contextual information' (i.e. narrow context) in the case of the indexical *haay* consists of three 'variables' or senses (discussed above and repeated here for clarity):

a. reference to a singular feminine entity
b. reference to a plural feminine entity
c. reference to a plural masculine entity.

In the case of the two marked variables b. and c., the process of assigning reference makes use of 'narrow' context to avoid ambiguity and to emphasize the

use of any of these marked variables. This narrow context is linguistic in origin and is generated by stating the exact noun (i.e. as plural feminine or plural masculine) that represents the referent within the CNP. Thus, in the marked uses, the speaker would say something like *haay liwlad* literally meaning 'this boys' or *haay elbanaat* 'this girls'.

Studying *haay* in context shows that this demonstrative has two different types of referentiality: semantic and pragmatic. The different possible number and gender denotations of *haay* are the 'short list of variables' (e.g. singular feminine) determined in context of the NP following *haay* within the complex demonstrative structure; this is narrow (i.e. semantic) context. Next, determining the speaker's intended referent depends on the addressee's awareness of 'broad' (i.e. pragmatic) context. Therefore, " broad context is taken to be any contextual information that is relevant to the working out of what the speaker overtly intends to mean" (Huang, 2007:215). That is, the initial stage of constructing the interactive meaning of *haay* is to situate it in narrow context to determine which of the three senses the speaker intends; this stage is immediately followed by that of recognizing the indexed referent along with the feelings the speaker intends to convey in broad context. These results confirm the hypothesis in this study that the semantic and pragmatic processes involved in the creation of the intended meaning of *haay* can be distinguished from each other based on different levels of context-sensitivity. Though these processes are distinct from each other, they are, however, sequentially interconnected.

We can perhaps also draw a line between the linguistic meaning of *haay* and its semantic meaning. First, the three different senses of *haay* are abstract and represent its *linguistic meaning*; this is "a meaning level which is unaffected by context, it is obligatory and automatic" (Ariel, 2002:392). Next, once used in narrow context, the speaker intends one and only one of the three possibilities available in the linguistic meaning, and so the selected meaning becomes the *semantic meaning* in (narrow) context. Finally, the third level of meaning is the *pragmatic meaning* comprised of indexing an entity and expressing attitudes towards it in broad (i.e. deictic) context. The first level of meaning (i.e. linguistic meaning) is not inferential while the second and third levels are inferential, though in varying degrees. The pragmatic aspect of this usage is related to broad context concerning the 'overt ' information that the speaker intends to add to the already selected semantic meaning. This pragmatic meaning can be an expressing of displeasure, sarcasm, and or astonishment regarding the exact referent. Of course, the speaker's intention here fills a 'semantic gap' (Bach, 2012) since it determines the semantic content of the demonstrative (see Stokke, 2010 on the role of intention in semantics).

The different meanings of *haay* as a complex demonstrative depend on the number and gender features of the noun within the NP following the demonstrative. These meanings are selected based on, at least, linguistic context. The demonstrative *haay* does not acquire any of its meanings unless it is placed within a context that includes the NP or referent it points at. This phenomenon is usually investigated as the 'compositionality' of words. Compositionality is usually discussed as one of the

components of literality (see Bartsch, 1996). The literal meaning of *haay* is not composed within itself but is rather a product of the interactive process between this demonstrative and the NP standing for the referent within linguistic context.

I avoid calling the final meaning of *haay* as pragmatic since it is partially the result of the (initial) semantic process in narrow context followed by a final pragmatic process in broad context. Instead, the expression 'interactive meaning' seems more adequate and is intended here to indicate the interaction between the sequential semantic and pragmatic processes towards the generation of the indexical function of *haay* in context. According to Cappelen and Lepore in *Insensitive Semantics* (2005:143), semantic content is "the content that can be grasped and reported by someone who is ignorant about the relevant characteristics of the context in which an utterance" of a sentence took place. According to Bach (2001:22), pragmatic "information is (extralinguistic) information that arises from an actual act of utterance. Whereas semantic information is encoded in what is uttered, pragmatic information is generated by, or at least made relevant by, the act of uttering it." The semantic content of *haay* will be any of the three mutually exclusive senses that exist independently of utterance context (i.e. broad context). That is, used within 'narrow context', only one of them is selected to be the single semantic value of *haay*. Narrow context can be looked at here as 'sentential' context. It is represented by the common noun phrase following *haay*. The three senses cannot be the semantic content of *haay* simultaneously. Once used to index an entity, narrow context activates only one of the three possible meanings which then enters the world of exophoric referentiality concerning the actual world of people, time, and place. This is the world of broad context where a sentence becomes an utterance. Semantic content is denoted by 'what is said' while pragmatic value is the product of matching semantic information with the physical context relevant to the utterance.

In their investigation of context sensitivity, and mainly with regard to sentences rather than to single words, Cappelen and Lepore (2005) argue that for a sentence to be context-sensitive, its semantic content has to 'shift' from one context to another (Cappelen and Lepore, 2005:104–105; see Doerge, 2010 for different perspectives). In the case of *haay* as a complex demonstrative, its semantic content shifts as a result of the change in both the linguistic and the physical context where it is used. The matter is so because to determine that *haay* has any of its three senses in context depends on the number and gender features of the noun in the NP following it within the complex demonstrative structure.

The semantic content of *haay* does not refer to any actual entities, it is abstract. The "commonsense understanding of deictic acts rests on interactions between schematic (or prefabricated) and local (or emergent) aspects of participant knowledge" (Hanks, 1990:75). The pragmatic potential of *haay*, thus, depends on contexts related to 'participant knowledge'; these contexts and the entities *haay* can deictically encode are limitless. This type of referentiality, however, seems to be a hybrid of semantics and pragmatics; it is semantic in the sense that the meaning assigned to *haay* is still abstract (i.e. a singular feminine, plural masculine, or plural

feminine entity). It is pragmatic in the sense that the addressee has to recognize the speaker's intention based on the semantic content, features of the complex demonstrative structure, context of interaction. The semantics-pragmatics interface in the case of *haay* is represented by this process of picking out a semantic variable within 'narrow' context which is then followed by recognizing the intended referent in the physical 'broad' context. The interval between the two processes is cognitively distinct.

4.Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

Analysis of the semantic and pragmatic aspects of the meaning of the demonstrative *haay* has confirmed the hypothesis that semantics and pragmatics can be distinguished on account of context-sensitivity. The acid test for distinguishing the semantic and pragmatic properties of the complex demonstrative *haay* has been the nature of the relation between meaning and context: whether it is limited (i.e. narrow) relating to the semantic senses of *haay* or pragmatic relating to the attitudes the speaker intends to communicate with regard to a particular referent. The semantic proposition as core meaning needs always to be incremented by the pragmatic anchoring in the immediate context of situation. The interface between the two processes occurs as a result of the pragmatic processes succeeding the semantic ones rather than the two processes being indistinctly merged with each other.

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